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N Florida, accusatory statements by a nontestifying declarant have
traditionally been classified as inadmissible hearsay.' Such state-
ments have, therefore, been excluded even when arguably relevant to
demonstrate a logical sequence of events or to demonstrate the basis
for an officer's subsequent conduct.2 A law enforcement officer, for
example, may not testify that he went to a particular location because
"X" told him that "Y" was selling drugs at that location. He may,
however, testify that he went to that location "on information re-
ceived."
Two early Florida cases, Kirby v. State and Collins v. State4 form
the doctrinal basis for what has been historically a per se rule of exclu-
sion for this type of testimony. In Kirby the trial court allowed a wit-
ness to testify that he went to a location b.ecause "Miss Ives said to
him that Kirby (defendant) had shot Ed." 5 The Florida Supreme
Court reversed the conviction because, in the court's view, the testi-
mony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted-i.e., that
Kirby had, in fact, shot Ed6-and was, therefore, hearsay. The court
then held that in such a situation the witness should simply state that
he or she went to the location because of information received and
should not repeat factual assertions of a nontestifying declarant.
7
Fifty years later, Collins arguably cast the rule in stone. In Collins
the trial court allowed the following testimony by the arresting offi-
cer:
Circuit Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Stuart, Florida; A.B., 1970, Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago; J.D., 1976, Illinois Institute of Technology/Kent College of Law; M.J.S., 1991,
University of Nevada/Reno.
I. See generally CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE §§ 401-403 (1992).
2. Id.
3. 32 So. 836 (Fla. 1902).
4. 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953).
5. Kirby, 32 So. at 838.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Q. Did you have information that Frank Collins and Esma Collins
were in this business (lottery) in this county?
A. I did.
Q. Did you have information that Frank Collins was collecting
money. .. and delivering it to some other person?
A. I did.'
The Florida Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, observed
that this testimony in effect told the jury "that an officer of the law
had made inquiry and had been told by some one or other that the
defendants were guilty." 9 In the court's view, the testimony was "ob-
viously incompetent ... [and] [p]lainly . . . hearsay." 0 Citing Kirby,
the court again held that "[a]n officer may say what he did pursuant
to information but he may not relate the information itself for such is
hearsay."" These two cases created in Florida evidence law what has
been characterized as a per se rule of exclusion for this type of testi-
mony.
However, recent cases have engendered considerable uncertainty
into this area of evidence law. In State v. Baird the Florida Supreme
Court seems to have retreated from the per se rule of exclusion and
chartered a new course for the treatment of this type of testimony. 2
Also, Bauer v. State, decided by the Second District Court of Appeal
just two years before Baird, appears to conflict with this new course,
especially when entrapment emerges as an issue in criminal cases."
This Article will discuss the doctrinal implications of the Baird deci-
sion as they relate to accusatory statements made by nontestifying de-
clarants. It will then trace the development of Florida's law regarding
entrapment and evidence deemed appropriate to rebut the defense.
The Article will examine the Bauer decision and its apparent conflict
with established Florida evidence law, and will discuss the need to ex-
amine further the introduction of other criminal acts as evidence ad-
missible to rebut an entrapment defense. Finally, the Article will
conclude by suggesting that modifying the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure could resolve the present uncertainty and ensure fairness to
both the state and the defense.
8. Collins, 65 So. 2d at 66.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 67 (citing Kirby v. State, 32 So. 836 (1902)). Collins also demonstrates that old
cases, unlike old soldiers, don't always just fade away. In the recent case of State v. Baird, 572
So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990), Kirby and Collins became the focal point. Baird and its impact will be
discussed infra text accompanying notes 20-54.
12. 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990).
13. 528 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
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II. KIRBY AND COLLINS REVISITED
Before discussing Baird, it might be helpful to examine Kirby and
Collins from the perspective of the Florida Evidence Code ("the
Code"). 4 The Code defines hearsay statements as those "offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,"'" and mandates
that hearsay is inadmissible unless certain specified circumstances ex-
ist.1 6 Arguably, the statements in Kirby and Collins were not hearsay
as defined by the Code because they were offered to show a basis for
a particular officer's action and not to prove gambling or homicide. 7
However, under the Code, the determination whether to exclude cer-
tain evidence does not end with a hearsay classification. The Code
also mandates, in all evidence questions, a second analytical step using
section 90.403.1 This section provides that "[r]elevant evidence is in-
admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'19 Therefore, apply-
ing the Code's two-step analysis could result in a determination that
while the statements may not technically be hearsay, their probative
value would be substantially outweighed by their unfair prejudice. So,
under the Code, analysis would lead to exclusion by the route the
court used in Baird, which is a different route from the hearsay classi-
fication the court used in Kirby and Collins.
In Baird the trial court allowed a Florida Department of Law En-
forcement (FDLE) agent to testify that he "had received information
that [Baird] was a major gambler and operating a major gambling
operation in the Pensacola area.''20 The First District Court, relying
on Collins, reversed. 2' Noting a conflict among the district courts of
appeal, the Florida Supreme Court granted review.22 In its analysis,
the supreme court recognized that "Collins appears to set forth a
blanket rule that an officer may explain what he did pursuant to in-
formation concerning the defendant, but under no circumstances may
he relate the information itself because such is hearsay." ' 23 The court
14. FLA. STAT. ch. 90 (1991).
15. Id. § 90.801(1)(c).
16. Id. §§ 90.802-.803.
17. See id. § 90.801(1)(c). See also State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904, 905 (Fla. 1990); Kirby v.
State, 32 So. 836, 838 (Fla. 1902).
18. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1991).
19. Id.
20. 572 So. 2d at 905.
21. Id. at906.
22. Id. at 905. The conflict arose between Baird and Harris v. State, 544 So. 2d 322 (Fla.
4th DCA 1989), which will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-46.
23. Baird, 572 So. 2d at 906.
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then questioned the continued validity of Collins because the case was
decided long before the Code was enacted.14 The court noted that, un-
der the Code, hearsay must involve
a statement offered ... to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It
is clear that under Florida's Evidence Code, testimony such as that
challenged in Collins, if offered for a purpose other than to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, would not be considered hearsay
and, if relevant to a material fact in issue, would generally be
admissible unless its probative value was found to be substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 5
In such a case, the court reasoned that "any prejudicial effect gener-
ally can be limited by giving instructions cautioning the jury as to the
limited use of the testimony. "26
The court then applied the Code's conceptual methodology.2 7 At
trial, Baird's counsel indicated in opening statement the evidence
would show the defendant was a victim of "selective prosecution.
' 28
Presumably, the defense's evidence would demonstrate that the offi-
cers were biased and, therefore, the evidence would relate to their
credibility, a material issue. But introducing such evidence would also
allow the State to rebut by showing that the law enforcement officials
had a good-faith basis for initiating the investigation, e.g., knowledge
of ongoing criminal activity.
However, the State introduced the testimony before the defense pre-
sented any evidence of the law enforcement officials' vindictive mo-
tive or bad faith. 29 Thus, while potentially relevant and material to the
issue of vindictiveness, the testimony was admitted "prematurely." 0
The Florida Supreme Court then carefully noted that:
when the only purpose for admitting testimony relating accusatory
information received from an informant is to show a logical
sequence of events leading up to an arrest, the need for the evidence
is slight and the likelihood of misuse is great. In light of the
inherently prejudicial effect of an out-of-court statement that the
defendant engaged in the criminal activity for which he is being tried
* . .the better practice is to allow the officer to state that he acted
24. Id. Collins was decided in 1953; the Florida Evidence Code was enacted in 1976.
25. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 906-07.
29. Id. at 907.
30. Id.
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upon a "tip" or "information received" without going into the
details of the accusatory information.
3'
In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically adopted the ap-
proach developed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Harris v.
State.3 2
In Harris the familiar Collins scenario occurred. The arresting offi-
cer was permitted to testify that an informant (declarant) had told him
(the officer) that a Haitian male was selling cocaine at a particular
location and that the same Haitian male was supplying him (declar-
ant) with cocaine.33 In reversing, the Fourth District Court identified
"two ... exceptions to the hearsay rule which have been applied in
circumstances similar to, but distinguishable from, those present in
this case. ' 34 According to the court, the first exception occurs in sce-
narios involving verbal acts." Verbal acts, the court observed, are part
of a transaction and serve to clarify acts that are incomplete or ambig-
uous in themselves.3 6 For example, the words "pay me next Friday"
clarify the simple exchange of money. The words demonstrate the in-
tent of the actor and the character of the transaction-e.g., a loan as
opposed to a gift.
37
The second scenario involved admitting testimony necessary to
show a logical sequence of events.3 8 In that context, the statements
were not part of the transaction,39 but by filling gaps in a sequence of
events, a witness could relate evidence that was not essential to estab-
lish the sequence and was "incriminating ...against the accused."
4
The court stated that the exception to the hearsay rule for such state-
ments extended to a witness's testimony that he or she had acted
based on "something they were told by an informant,' '4 but not to
the informant's actual accusatory remarks. 42
The hearsay classification used by the court in Harris demonstrates
the semantic quagmire into which reviewing courts routinely slip when
confronted by this type of testimony. Throughout the opinion, the
31. Id. at 908.
32. 544 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
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court applied the Code's section 90.403 to balance the evidence's pro-
bative value versus its prejudicial effect in an attempt to avoid the
hearsay label.43 The court explained that "a fine line ... must be
drawn between a statement merely justifying or explaining such [law
enforcement] presence or activity and one that includes incriminating
(and usually unessential) details." 44 The court, therefore, felt that in
such a situation the need for the testimony is slight and the likelihood
of misuse is great.45 Unfortunately, the court's conclusion slipped into
pre-Code semantic labeling."
In summary, the decision in Baird signaled a significant departure
from previous Florida law. Accusatory statements about a defendant
made by a nontestifying declarant are no longer excluded per se. 47 In-
stead, courts must employ a two-step approach." The initial step re-
quires evaluating the reason for which a given statement is offered.
49
If offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is
inadmissible as hearsay.50 However, if offered for another purpose,
exclusion on hearsay grounds is inappropriate and the court must ap-
ply the second step of the procedure." The second, or section 90.403,
test requires the court to determine to which issue the proffered testi-
43. Id.
44. Id. (relying on MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). Harris
also demonstrates the truth of the adage that defining hearsay is like nailing down Jell-O. As
noted, the court in Harris established that information offered solely to establish a logical con-
nection is hearsay. Harris is correct under the Code because statements, if offered for any reason
other than the truth of the matter asserted and if relevant (logically) to a material issue, are not
hearsay. See State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1990) (testimony offered to establish a
logical sequence of events was deemed nonhearsay because it was offered to refute an entrap-
ment defense and not to prove the defendant actually committed the acts in the statements). As
noted, the Harris opinion quotes McCormick on Evidence, which states:
[O]ne area of apparently widespread abuse should be noted. In criminal cases, an
arresting or investigating officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just
to have happened upon the scene; he should be allowed some explanation of his pres-
ence and conduct. His testimony that he acted "upon information received," or words
to that effect, should be sufficient. Nevertheless, cases abound in which the officer is
allowed to relate historical aspects of the case, replete with hearsay statements in the
form of complaints and reports, on the ground that he was entitled to give the infor-
mation upon which he acted. The need for the evidence is slight, the likelihood of
misuse great.
Harris v. State, 544 So. 2d 323, 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (quoting McCoRMCK ON EVIDENCE)
(emphasis added). Sadly, even the Grand Muftis of evidence find themselves impaled on the
issue of hearsay versus nonhearsay.
45. Harris, 544 So. 2d at 324.
46. Id. at 324-25.
47. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904.
48. Id. at 907-08.




mony relates and then to balance probative value against unfair preju-
dice.12 Thus, the Baird approach envisions an evidentiary scalpel
rather than a conceptual meat ax. 3
Baird will assume even greater importance because of recent devel-
opments concerning the entrapment defense. As indicated previ-
ously, 4 a 1988 decision of the Second District Court of Appeal has
created uncertainty about the admission of accusatory statements by a
nontestifying declarant to rebut an entrapment defense. Therefore, it
will be necessary to review the development of Florida law of entrap-
ment and to examine appropriate methods to rebut that defense.
Changes in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure may be necessary
to ensure a more orderly and fair procedure when an entrapment de-
fense is raised.
III. FLORIDA'S ENTRAPMENT LAW-THE EARLY YEARS
Entrapment has been recognized as a viable criminal defense for an
extended period of time.55 Initially, Florida courts adhered to what
has been called subjective entrapment, which focuses on a defendant
to determine whether government actions enticed or lured him or her
into committing an offense. If the enticement caused the defendant to
commit an offense he or she would not otherwise have committed,
then entrapment is a complete defense. However, to determine entrap-
ment, the defendant's predisposition to commit the offense becomes
relevant because demonstrated predisposition of a defendant rebuts
52. Id.
53. In a subsequent case, Hodges v. State, 595 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1992), the court seemed to
stray from the Baird analysis. Hodges was tried and convicted for first-degree murder. During
the guilt phase the trial court allowed officers to testify that before the murder the victim in-
tended to press charges against Hodges for indecent exposure. The court classified this testimony
as hearsay and found it harmless error because it was cumulative. Id. at 932-33. Arguably, the
evidence was not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted. However, it was arguably rele-
vant to motive and therefore premeditation, i.e., a statement of a person's intention to show
subsequent action under § 90.803(3)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Without analysis, the court rejected
this argument. In a more recent case, Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992), the court
returned to the Baird analysis to resolve the admissibility of prior consistent statements of a
victim of child abuse. These statements of the victim are repeated by non-declarants, i.e., wit-
nesses. The court cautioned that even if the statements are admissible under § 90.803(23), "a
trial court must weigh the reliability and the probative value of a child victim's hearsay statement
against the danger that the statement will unfairly prejudice the defendant, confuse the issues at
trial, mislead the jury, or result in the presentation of needlessly cumulative evidence." Id. at
668. This approach is completely consistent with that in Baird. See also Anderson v. State, 598
So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (Zehmer, J., dissenting) (giving an excellent discussion of
the balancing test envisioned in Baird).
54. See supra text accompanying note 13.
55. SeeEHRHARDT, supra note 1, §404.15.
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entrapment. Langford v. State,5 6 an early case, is illustrative. In Lang-
ford the Florida Supreme Court noted:
In determining whether or not an entrapment may be sufficient to
constitute a defense, the distinction to be observed is the difference
between cases where in one it is shown that officers, in order to
establish the basis for a prosecution, entice one who is not engaged
in a criminal enterprise to commit an offense mala prohibita, when
otherwise the person so enticed would not have engaged in such
enterprise, and in the other it is shown that one engaged in an
unlawful enterprise is enticed to do an act which may be used as
direct evidence of his guilt. 7
Early Florida entrapment cases adhered closely to the rationale ap-
plied in Sorrells v. United States, a U.S. Supreme Court decision that
also focused on a defendant's subjective predisposition to commit an
offense."'
The early cases recognized that predisposition could be established
through evidence of both real and suspected criminal activity by the
defendant. 59 Story v. State,60 an early and influential case, recognized
the foregoing principle of relevance. Story appealed his conviction for
possession and sale of heroin.6 1 On appeal, he challenged the suffi-
ciency of the state's evidence of his predisposition to commit the
crime in response to his entrapment defense.6 1 In rejecting this chal-
lenge, the court noted that:
[olnce the evidence is introduced which suggests the possibility of
entrapment, the State must prove that the defendant was predisposed
to commit the offense charged. This will typically be done through
the introduction of evidence of the defendant's prior convictions or
of the defendant's reputation for engaging in certain illicit
activities.
63
56. 149 So. 570 (Fla. 1933).
57. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
58. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also State v. Dickinson, 370 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1979) ("The
essential element of the defense of entrapment is the absence of a predisposition of the defendant
to commit the offense."); Lashley v. State, 67 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1953) ("One who is investi-
gated, induced, or lured by an officer of the law or other person, for the purpose of prosecution,
into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing may avail
himself of the defense of 'entrapment."') (emphasis in original).
59. See, e.g., Story v. State, 355 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1214.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1215 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v.
Cooper, 321 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1963); Marion v. State, 287 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974);
State v. Nelsen, 228 N.W.2d 143 (S.D. 1975)).
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The court further held that a defendant's predisposition "can be es-
tablished by evidence of the officer's 'reasonable suspicion' that the
defendant was engaged in illegal activities." . . .This will frequently
be established through the tip of a reliable informant. ' 65 The ap-
proach outlined in Story gained wide acceptance in Florida appellate
courts and has been uniformly followed.66
Interestingly enough, the decision in Story appears to be partially
consistent with the evidentiary methodology outlined in Baird. Once a
defendant raised entrapment as a defense, predisposition becomes a
material issue in the case. Under Story, that issue may be demon-
strated by an officer's reasonable suspicion based on an informant's
tip.6 Therefore, the evidence is not offered for its truth, but rather as
circumstantial or indirect evidence of predisposition. Consequently,
step one of the Baird test requiring the evidence be classified as non-
hearsay before it will be admissible would seem to be satisfied. Unfor-
tunately, these early decisions written before the Code was enacted do
not address the second, section 90.403, issue: probative value versus
prejudicial effect.
IV. ENTRAPMENT EXPANDs-THE OBJECTIVE STAGE
The Florida Supreme Court expanded the scope of the entrapment
defense in Cruz v. State.6 The expansion consisted of recognizing ob-
jective entrapment as a viable defense in criminal prosecutions.69 Ob-
jective entrapment, unlike its subjective counterpart, focuses on the
actions of law enforcement .1 As defined by the supreme court, objec-
tive entrapment focuses on "police conduct" that "falls below stan-
dards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of
governmental power." 7' The court gave further content to this rather
indefinite and nebulous standard by stating that "[e]ntrapment has
not occurred as a matter of law where police activity (1) has as its end
64. Story v. State, 355 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (citing State v. Burow, 514
S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1974)).
65. Id. (citing Brosi v. State, 263 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)).
66. See, e.g., State v. Sokos, 426 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (state may show
predisposition by prior criminal activity, reasonable suspicion of such activity, or ready acquies-
cence in crime to defend against entrapment); State v. Casper, 417 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982) ("State may demonstrate predisposition by proof of the defendant's prior criminal activi-
ties, his reputation for such activities, reasonable suspicion of his involvement in such activity,
or his ready acquiescence in the commission of the crime.").
67. Story, 355 So. 2d at 1215.
68. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
69. Id. at 520.
70. Id. at 521.
71. Id. (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958)).
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the interruption of a specific ongoing criminal activity; and (2) utilizes
means reasonably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing
criminal activity. '72 Objective entrapment is unlike subjective entrap-
ment in another material respect: It presents a question of law for the
court. In contrast, subjective entrapment is a factual issue determined
by the ultimate fact-finder.
Subsequently, in State v. Wheeler7 the supreme court analyzed the
state's burden of proof when subjective entrapment becomes an issue
in a case. The court stated that:
The defendant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of entrapment .... If the defendant has not made a prima
facie case, the defense of entrapment does not go to the jury. If,
however, a prima facie case is made, the issue of entrapment is
submitted to the jury with appropriate instruction .... The burden
lies with the state to disprove entrapment, which is usually done by
proving the predisposition of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . [usually] by showing that the defendant had prior
convictions or a reputation for engaging in similar illicit acts, by
showing that the investigating officers had a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was engaging in such acts, or by showing the
defendant's "ready acquiescence."
74
Baird, Cruz, and Wheeler seemingly reaffirm the continued vitality
of Story. As indicated previously, 7 step one of Baird is clearly satis-
fied. However, the Second District's decision in Bauer v. State 6 seems
to cast doubt and generate uncertainty over what appeared to be a
settled issue.
V. BAUER: HEARSAY LABELS AND MATERIAL ISSUES-A CONFLICT
DEVELOPS
Bauer was convicted of seven counts of dealing in stolen property.1
7
The appellate record reflects that during cross-examination of a state
witness, the defense "posed certain questions designed to establish the
defense of entrapment. 78 On redirect, the State attempted to demon-
strate predisposition using the following question and answer:
72. Id. at 522.
73. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
74. Id. at 981 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75. See supra Section Il.
76. 528 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id.
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Q. Why did you seek introduction to Mr. Scaglione and Mr. Bauer
and start your undercover investigation to begin with in this case?
A. I was given information by a confidential source that there were
activities going on in the particular restaurant involving Mr.
Scaglione and Mr. Bauer to the fact that dealing and selling of stolen
property was occurring within that particular establishment involving
those two particular individuals, Mr. Scaglione and Mr. Bauer.
9
It would appear that, unlike Baird, subjective entrapment was clearly
an issue in the case when the testimony was elicited. 0 Thus rebuttal
evidence designed to demonstrate predisposition was arguably appro-
priate. ," Writing for the majority, Judge Schoonover began his analy-
sis by observing that "[wihen, as here, the defense of subjective
entrapment is properly raised, the state has the burden of proving that
the accused had the predisposition to commit the offense charged. '"82
The State could demonstrate predisposition by "showing that a defen-
dant has prior convictions or a reputation for committing similar
crimes, that law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that the de-
fendant was engaged in similar crimes, or the defendant showed ready
acquiescence to commit the crime suggested by law enforcement."I 3
Nonetheless, the majority held that "[any reasonable interpretation
of Agent Chouinard's testimony leads to the conclusion that it was
introduced by the state to prove the truth of the words spoken by the
confidential informant, i.e., that the appellant was dealing in and sell-
ing stolen property prior to Agent Chouinard's investigation."4 The
majority then cited Collins and reiterated the standard pre-Baird lan-
guage that although a law enforcement officer "may testify as to what
action he took pursuant to information received from a confidential
informant, his testimony regarding the content of such information
constitutes hearsay.''85 While the court recognized that the State could
establish predisposition by evidence of a defendant's reputation for
committing similar criminal acts, the court classified the reputation
testimony given as inadmissible hearsay.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority in Bauer relied principally
on two cases, Morris v. State 6 and United States v. Webster.17 In
79. Id.
80. See id. at 7-8.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. 487 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1986).
87. 649 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Morris the trial court excluded evidence of statements made by a criti-
cal state informant to a defense witness.8" In those statements, the in-
formant indicated that he intended to set up Morris. 9 In reversing, the
court found the statements were admissible as evidence of the infor-
mant's state of mind offered to show his subsequent conduct.9 Thus,
the Bauer majority's reliance on Morris appears misplaced. The state-
ments in Morris were hearsay because they were offered to establish
the truth of the matter asserted-that the informant did in fact subse-
quently set up Morris 9 -but were admissible as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. 92 In Bauer, on the other hand, the statements were not
hearsay because they were not offered to establish the truth of the
matter asserted, but rather to show the defendant's predisposition. 9
Arguably, the Bauer majority fell into the tautological semantic trap
that Baird should have eliminated. Further, the majority's conclusion
in Bauer is also totally inconsistent with the Story, Cruz, and Wheeler
decisions approving admission of such testimony for the precise rea-
son the majority in Bauer rejected it.
As indicated,94 the majority in Bauer also relied on United States v.
Webster, a Fifth Circuit opinion written by Senior Judge Hill. 9 Web-
ster was convicted of possessing and distributing cocaine and a princi-
pal issue in his trial was the question of entrapment.9 To demonstrate
predisposition, the government permitted a Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agent to testify that a reliable informant told him of
several occasions where the defendant sold him cocaine." First, Judge
Hill recognized that in entrapment cases "the focal point of the in-
quiry is on the predisposition of the defendant." 98 Predisposition, he
wrote, must be proven in accordance with applicable evidence law
which "frowns upon attempts to prove facts by statements made out-
side the courtroom."" Thus, statements made by an informant to a
law enforcement officer about a defendant's criminal reputation,
about specific instances in which the defendant engaged in criminal
activity, or statements about the defendant by various sources re-
88. 487 So. 2d at 292.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 293.
91. Id.
92. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a)2. (1991).
93. Bauer v. State, 528 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
94. See supra text accompanying note 87.
95. 649 F.2d 346 (Sth Cir. 1981).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 349.
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corded in police reports are clearly hearsay when offered to prove pre-
disposition.1°0 Judge Hill then turned to a section 90.403 balancing
test.' 0 1 The statements offered to demonstrate Webster's predisposi-
tion were in his view "gross hearsay,"' 0 2 and, therefore, he was "hard
pressed to envision a situation where the disparity between the proba-
tive value and prejudicial effect of evidence is greater."'0 3
Webster is the prevailing view in federal courts concerning this type
of testimony.'14 However, as Judge Campbell forcefully argued in his
dissent to the Bauer opinion, the applicability of the Webster rationale
is tenuous at best. 05 Judge Campbell argued that the Bauer majority
violated Hoffman v. Jones'06 by ignoring established Florida prece-
dent as expressed in Cruz and Wheeler.17 This appears to be a telling
argument. As indicated previously, Cruz and Wheeler explicitly reaf-
firmed the continuing vitality of Story, thus allowing the State to
prove predisposition by evidence of the investigating officer's reasona-
ble suspicion of the defendant's involvement in criminal activity simi-
lar to the offense charged. Baird strengthened the conclusion that,
under the Code, the evidence is simply not hearsay because it is di-
rected to the material issue of predisposition. In addition, Florida ap-
parently still recognizes objective, as well as subjective, entrapment. 0 8
100. Id.
101. Id. at 350-51.
102. Id. at 350.
103. Id. Judge Hill was also troubled by the possible use of a government agent's testimony
to show reputation or character. This testimony, even if relevant to show predisposition, came
from a witness who "[ailmost always is not qualified to speak on behalf of the community,
testifies as to what the informant told him about the defendant's reputation, and the informant's
statements are themselves based on information from other sources." Id. at 350 n.7.
In my view, this concern points out the differences between federal and state law enforcement.
While it is certainly plausible that federal agents may not have street smarts attuned to local
operators because of frequent transfers and service in areas with which they are unfamiliar, the
opposite is true of local law enforcement. The "locals" are immersed in street culture and most
assuredly are familiar with the "word" on the street. In my view, this illustrates why state courts
should be wary of leaping on the federal bandwagon and why the federal system should recog-
nize that state courts operate in a totally different milieu.
104. See United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnston, 426
F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1969); Whiting v.
United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961).
105. See Bauer v. State, 528 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (Campbell, J., dissenting).
106. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Hoffman stands for the proposition that district courts of
appeal are bound by the Florida Supreme Court's decisions. Id. Therefore, the Bauer majority's
reliance on Morris as authority "which requires us to reverse," Bauer, 528 So. 2d at 9, is tenu-
ous at best.
107. See Bauer, 528 So. 2d at 9.
108. Any doubt concerning the continuing vitality of objective entrapment seems to have
been put to rest in State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1991). In Hunter the supreme court held
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Thus, in Florida, unlike in the federal courts, the evidence is relevant
in determining whether the police engaged in impermissible virtue test-
ing.
Judge Campbell's dissent, like Judge Hill's opinion, also slips into a
section 90.403 balancing test. "This type of testimony," he argues:
[I]s not so prejudicial as the Webster majority states because it is
allowed in solely to rebut the defense of entrapment that has been
affirmatively raised by the defendant. Entrapment is something akin
to a plea of confession and avoidance. The defendant admits the
offense, but seeks to avoid the consequences of it because, the
defense alleges, the state induced him to perform the act. Normally,
the severe prejudice of allowing testimony concerning prior similar
conduct by a defendant comes about because it may influence a jury
to believe that because a defendant may have done such a thing in
the past, he might therefore be guilty of doing the act with which he
is charged. Because in an entrapment case the issue is not whether a
defendant committed an act, but why, the possible prejudicial effect
on a jury by the use of such prior act testimony is simply not
present. 109
VI. BAIRD AND BAUER-THE LIMITS OF LABELS
The conflict over hearsay versus nonhearsay in the use of reputation
testimony demonstrates the limitations of conceptual labels. Indeed,
that "[bly focusing on police conduct, this objective entrapment standard includes due process
considerations." Id. at 322. See also Ricardo v. State, 591 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See
also Krajewski v. State, 589 So. 2d 254 (1991), where the supreme court quashed the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's holding that objective entrapment would not be recognized as a de-
fense in that judicial district and remanded the case to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. On
remand, the Fourth District held that Krajewski had not been entrapped, Krajewski v. State, 597
So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), and the Florida Supreme Court has granted review of the case.
Lewis v. State, 597 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
In any event, unlike subjective entrapment, objective entrapment is a purely legal defense to
be decided by the court. Presumably, under the Baird rationale, a court could hear evidence on
the issue of impermissible targeting or methods to determine that issue. The same evidence could
then be excluded on a section 90.403 basis when offered to show predisposition on the part of
the defendant. The central concern of this Article is subjective entrapment, which presents
unique procedural and evidentiary problems that will be the subject of further discussion in this
Article. See also Herrera v. State, 594 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring).
109. Bauer v. State, 528 So. 2d 6, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In Herrera the supreme court
seemed to accept Judge Campbell's analysis of the entrapment defense. Justice McDonald, writ-
ing for the court, observed "entrapment is an affirmative defense and, as such, is in the nature
of an avoidance of the charges." Herrera, 594 So. 2d at 277, Justice McDonald continued by
concluding that:
[P]redisposition to commit a crime, however, is not the same as the intent to commit
that crime. As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this
issue, "predisposition is not the same as mens tea. The former involves the defen-
dant's character and criminal inclinations; the latter involves the defendant's state of
mind while carrying out the allegedly criminal act."
Id. at 278 (quoting State v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236, 1242 (N.J. 1984)).
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both Judge Hill and Judge Campbell, while valiantly attempting to
avoid it themselves, slipped into the conceptual quagmire. Baird, in
my view, represents the proper analysis envisioned by the Evidence
Code. Close examination of both judges' opinions reveals that the real
bone of contention is probative value versus prejudicial effect of repu-
tation evidence. Under the Code, even if the evidence is not objection-
able on hearsay grounds, it must satisfy other Code provisions to be
admissible. Section 90.401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence
tending to prove or disprove a material fact."" 0 This is the threshold
test of logical probative value. Section 90.402 provides that "[aill rele-
vant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.""' 1 This provi-
sion announces a broad rule of admission subject to limits imposed by
law. Arguably, this could include both statutory and judicial limita-
tions. The next provision, section 90.403,112 is the heart of the eviden-
tiary equation.
Section 90.403's "safety valve" or "cut-off switch" is designed to
prevent evidentiary overload. Under this provision, admittedly rele-
vant evidence is excluded "if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.""' One noted commentator observed that the valve serves to
prevent decisions founded on an improper basis." 4 This section tests
evidence on a legal versus logical basis. Given the obvious impact of
"bad guy" evidence, one can argue, as did Judge Hill, that uncorro-
borated street gossip is simply too prejudicial even in an entrapment
scenario. As Professor Charles W. Ehrhardt notes, "[in weighing the
probative value against the unfair prejudice, it is proper for the court
to consider the need for the evidence [and] the tendency of the evi-
dence to suggest an improper basis to the jury for resolving the mat-
ter, e.g., an emotional basis.""'
Like any other material fact, predisposition can be decided on an
improper basis if unreliable evidence is used. Given present procedure,
it is virtually impossible for a trial court to do an adequate Baird-type
balancing procedure. In addition, the present use of "suspicion" and
"reputation" evidence ignores the requirements of another critical
provision of the Evidence Code, section 90.404.116




114. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 403.
115. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (1991).
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VII. ENTRAPMENT, PREDISPOSITION, AND THE "WILLIAMS RULE"-
THE BLACK HOLES IN FLORIDA EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
As Judge Campbell noted, subjective entrapment is an affirmative
defense."1 7 The defendant admits the actions giving rise to the charge
but alleges that he lacks criminal inclination and was lured into the
offense. It is a defense of confession and avoidance. Under present
procedure, however, the defense need not be raised in the pleadings."
8
Thus, in my experience, it is not unusual for the defense to first sur-
face at the charge conference when the defense requests an instruction
on the issue. Weaver v. State"9 illustrates the problems that routinely
occur when entrapment surfaces for the first time at trial.
In Weaver the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with
intent to distribute. 20 Trial evidence indicated that when the defen-
dant became the target of a narcotics investigation, police enlisted the
assistance of his girlfriend.' 21 At the time of her conversion to good
citizenship, she was incarcerated on drug charges and secured her re-
lease by agreeing to serve as a confidential informant in the investiga-
tion.122 The evidence further revealed that, over a four-day period, the
girlfriend/confidential informant repeatedly requested that the defen-
dant obtain heroin for her.'23 Finally, at a party arranged by the de-
fendant-complete with birthday greetings, flowers, champagne, and
candy-she once more requested heroin after ensuring the defendant
was in the right "mood."' 124 The defendant did not delay. Undoubt-
edly smitten, surely hopeful, and no doubt completely unaware, he
obtained the drugs, and his arrest, trial, and conviction followed with
equal alacrity.
21
These facts were developed on cross-examination and the defendant
elected not to testify. 26 At the charge conference, defense counsel re-
quested an entrapment instruction, which was denied.12 7 The Fourth
District reversed Weaver's conviction but noted that "[w]e foresee
problems in this and other future cases when the defendant relies
solely on cross-examination of State witnesses to support a defense of
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. SeeFL.R. Crv. P. 1.110 (1991).
119. 370 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).





125. Id. at 1190-91.
126. Id. at 1191.
127. Id.
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entrapment. Here, the defendant filed nothing before trial giving no-
tice of his intent to rely on entrapment."' 28 The court observed that
defense counsel "waived opening statement and defendant did not
take the stand and offered no evidence. It was thus not until the
charge conference that the State knew defendant was relying on en-
trapment.' ' 2 9 Thus, the State was effectively precluded from offering
evidence of predisposition in rebuttal.'30 The court held that in such
circumstances, the requested instruction should be given but the State
should be allowed to reopen and present rebuttal evidence. 3' This
procedure is now generally followed.' 32
While facially appealing, the solution is fraught with procedural
and practical difficulties. Procedurally, under Florida Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 3.220, discovery is closed once the trial begins. 3 Addi-
tional witnesses or evidence would arguably require a full-blown
"Richardson" hearing. 34 At that hearing, the State could face signifi-
cant obstacles to introduction of new evidence. From a practical
standpoint, the State would probably be hard-pressed to locate predis-
position evidence of any kind. Given the astronomical caseloads at
present, the attendant delays should be avoided if other procedural
remedies can be utilized.
Also, the present procedure seemingly fails to comport with section
90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, the "Williams Rule" provision.' This
section provides that:
[slimilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the
evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
3 6
Section 90.404(2)(b) requires:
128. Id. To paraphrase a venerable law enforcement metaphor, the rules in entrapment are
like the rules in a knife fight: There ain't no rules.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Joiner v. State, 382 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
133. FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.220 (1991).
134. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 774-75 (Fla. 1971). Richardson requires the court
to determine if non-disclosure was willful or inadvertent, trivial or substantial, and what effect it
had on the ability of the other party to prepare for trial.
135. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). Williams allows the presentation of evi-
dence that could be used to prove predisposition if such evidence is offered in compliance with
section 90.404(2)(a) of the Code.
136. FLA. STAr. § 90.404(2)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
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When the state ... intends to offer evidence of other criminal
offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the
state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or
offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity
required of an indictment or information. No notice is required for
evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal.'
3 7
"Williams Rule" evidence is admissible to show predisposition and
thus prove that criminal intent originated with the accused. Given the
present procedure, limitations placed on "Williams Rule" evidence
are largely ignored.1 31 Thus, procedural safeguards are not utilized to
prevent the use of unreliable information, such as the types described
by Judge Hill. While the present procedure does not require notice for
rebuttal in the entrapment scenario, it certainly does not, in my view,
envision that section 90.404(2)(a) also be ignored. The present proce-
dure employed in Florida trial courts simply does not provide ade-
quate compliance with the stringent requirements concerning use of
this type of testimony.
VIII. PRESENT PROBLEMS; A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The present procedure in entrapment cases encourages the sort of
ambush tactics the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed
to prevent. As the Fourth District Court noted in Weaver, the de-
fense, with full advantage of Florida's liberal discovery rules, can lit-
erally lie in wait and spring the entrapment defense after the close of
the evidence. 13 9 The State can also wait and argue that because of de-
fense tactics it should be allowed to use evidence of questionable relia-
bility. This results in use of evidence that is often nothing more than
suspicion, rumor, and street gossip received from questionable
sources. Or, as Judge Hill diplomatically noted, persons "whose moti-
vations may be less than honorable."' 14 In such a situation, a trial




137. Id. § 90.404(2)(b).
138. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, §§ 404.9-.20. In summary, other crime evidence must be
both logically and legally relevant. In addition, there must not be overkill; the evidence of the
crimes must not become a central feature of the trial. Our present procedures, or rather lack
thereof, make it hard for the trial court to conduct the critical section 90.403 balancing test
mandated by Baird and envisioned by the Code. See United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 350
(5th Cir. 1981).
139. Weaver v. State, 370 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
140. Webster, 649 F.2d at 350.
141. Id.
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At present, Florida does not require defendants to provide notice of
their intent to rely on an entrapment defense. In Webster, Judge Hill,
writing for the Fifth Circuit, noted the potential problem when he
stated:
We are not unaware that our holding today may cause ... some
difficulties in future trials. Often the government will have no reason
to believe prior to the trial that the defendant intends to raise an
entrapment defense. If the defendant waits until the trial is under
way to raise the defense, the government may find itself in the
difficult position of having quickly to locate and prepare witnesses it
did not believe would be needed. We in no way wish to encourage
tactics that impede the proper administration of trials. To avoid this
problem, the district courts may, by local rule, require defendants to
disclose their intention to raise the defense prior to trial. 42
Expanding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.200 to require no-
tice of the intent to rely on an entrapment defense would eliminate the
foregoing problems for the State. The quid pro quo from the defense
standpoint would be to require that the State comply with section
90.404(2)(b) in entrapment cases. This provision would prevent the
use of unreliable, uncorroborated evidence. It would also require
compliance with substantive requirements concerning use of "Wil-
liams Rule" testimony. Finally, the proposed changes would allow
trial courts to adequately fulfill their responsibilities of properly bal-
ancing the probative value of predisposition evidence offered by the
State in accordance with section 90.403. A proper balance would en-
sure that the type of inflammatory and unreliable evidence described
by Judge Hill would not reach the fact-finder. 143 A notice requirement
used in conjunction with available pretrial procedures would alleviate
many problems in this area.'"4
142. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
143. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(f), (k), (p) gives trial judges extensive author-
ity over case management. The provisions allow trial judges to schedule pretrial conferences,
alter times for discovery and even order additional discovery. A trial judge, alerted by a notice
of entrapment, can easily use these tools to remedy the problems outlined by the court in
Weaver. This would increase pretrial work, but would be preferable to the present unstructured
approach.
144. The following proposal is currently being considered by the Rules Committee of the
Criminal Law Section of The Florida Bar. If approved, it will be submitted to the Florida Su-
preme Court for its approval:
NOTICE OF ENTRAPMENT
PROPOSED RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
Upon the written demand of the State Attorney, a Defendant who intends to offer
evidence of entrapment shall not less than ten days before trial or such other time as
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In conclusion, the issue of how to properly prove predisposition
when faced with the question of entrapment presents multidimen-
sional issues in the trial context. These issues, which include pleading
procedure and substantive evidence, have become more immediate be-
cause of the Baird and Bauer decisions. As indicated, Baird will re-
quire trial courts to utilize section 90.403 more discriminately and to
rely less on conceptual labels. This will require procedural adjust-
ments when entrapment is an issue. As an affirmative defense, entrap-
ment should be pled like insanity or alibi as required by the reciprocal
notice requirements of the proposed rule change. The notice require-
ments of section 90.404(2)(b) should be applied to state evidence in-
tended to demonstrate predisposition to allow the trial judge to
the Court may direct, file and serve upon such prosecuting attorney notice of his in-
tention to claim such entrapment. Such notice shall contain a statement of particulars
showing the nature of the entrapment the Defendant expects to show and the names
and addresses of the witnesses by whom he expects to show such entrapment. Not
more than five days after receipt of such notice or at such other time as the Court may
direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the Defendant the names and
addresses, (as particularly as are known to the prosecuting attorney), of the witnesses
the State proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the Defendant's entrapment defense
at trial. The state shall also, in conformity with F.S. 90.404(2)(a)(b), disclose evidence
of such other crimes, wrongs, or acts upon which it proposes to offer to further rebut
the defense. Both the Defendant and the State shall be under a continuing duty to
promptly disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the
attention of either party subsequent to filing their respective witness lists as provided
in this rule. The prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to disclose
additional evidence of crimes, wrongs or acts which come to his attention and which
he proposes to offer to rebut the defense of entrapment. If a Defendant fails to file
and serve a copy of such notice as herein required, the Court may exclude evidence
offered by such Defendant for the purpose of demonstrating entrapment, except the
testimony of the Defendant. If such notice is given by the Defendant, the Court may
exclude testimony of any witness for the purpose of demonstrating entrapment. If the
prosecuting attorney fails to file and serve on the Defendant a list of witnesses or such
other crimes, wrongs, or acts as herein provided, the Court may exclude evidence of-
fered by the State to rebut the Defendant's entrapment defense. For good cause
shown, the Court may waive the requirements of this rule.
COMMITTEE NOTE
Florida, at present, has no rule governing the entrapment defense. Entrapment, an
affirmative defense much like alibi or insanity, often involves use of what would oth-
erwise be Williams Rule evidence offered by the State to demonstrate predisposition of
the Defendant. In many instances, the Court is unaware of a Defendant's intent to
rely on such a defense until the charge conference. The State is then allowed, at pres-
ent, to reopen to rebut the defense. This rule is intended to implement the suggestion
offered by Senior Judge James Hill of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Web-
ster. It is further intended to ensure that the Court will be afforded an opportunity to
prevent use of collateral crimes evidence that is unreliable or unduly prejudicial, F.S,
90.403. Use of the notice requirements of F.S. 90.404 will effectuate prompt notice
and orderly, fair procedure.
Draft, Rules Committee, Criminal Law Section, The Florida Bar (undated) (on file with commit-
tee).
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properly apply the section 90.403 balancing test. It will ensure that
what is in fact "Williams Rule" evidence will be admitted or excluded
in accordance with established standards. Finally, trial judges must
effectively utilize the procedural and evidentiary notice requirements
in conjunction with pretrial procedures. This multidimensional, sys-
temic approach can alleviate the existing evidentiary and procedural
shortcomings when dealing with hearsay.

